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Toward a Hobbesian Liberal Democracy
Through a Maslowian Hierarchy of Needs
Henrik Skaug Sætra
Østfold University College
Thomas Hobbes is a mainstay in political theory, but his political philosophy is often
perceived as being marred by his insistence on absolute power and the rule of one—or the
few. In this article I examine how a reinterpretation and adjustment of the psychological
fundament of Hobbes’s systematic argument may in fact lead to a new understanding of how
a Hobbesian argument could lead to the conclusion that liberalism and democracy are best
for achieving order and stability. This reexamination is performed by reinterpreting Hobbes’s
psychology in light of the writings of Abraham Maslow. Their reputations could hardly be
more different, but I show that their theories of individuals are largely compatible, and that
incorporating some of Maslow’s insights into Hobbes’s general framework may lead to a
surprisingly modern Hobbesian political theory, because individual’s domination by the
higher needs, when safe, may entail demands for liberty and self-determination.
Keywords: Hobbes, Maslow, human nature, liberty, safety
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) was one of the first to propose a thoroughly systematic
and individualistic political philosophy. In Leviathan (1946), first published in 1651,
Hobbes describes human nature in great detail and proceeds to deduce how society should
be shaped. As a methodological individualist, the form of the state is solely derived from
his conception of individuals and their nature. Despite his fame (some would say infamy),
Hobbes’s conclusions are controversial, and some might regard his recommendation of the
absolutist state as proof that Hobbes is more of a relic than a relevant philosopher for
modern times. Hobbes’s systematic approach to political philosophy may be timeless, but
the building blocks found in Leviathan are certainly not exempt from criticism. The
building block I focus on in this article is the fundamental one: namely, human beings and
their human nature. What are the consequences for Hobbes’s political philosophy, if we
reinterpret the premises involving human nature?
For any methodological individualist, psychology and other disciplines concerned
with human nature are of obvious value. I shall examine how borrowing some insights
from such an unlikely candidate as Abraham Maslow (1908 –1970) lets us construct
a Hobbesian argument with different conclusions from the ones Hobbes himself
arrived at.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to X Henrik Skaug Sætra, De-
partment of Business, Languages, and Social Sciences, Østfold University College, P.O. Box 700,
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Maslow and Hobbes are more alike than most would imagine, and Maslow’s famous
hierarchy of needs, introduced into a Hobbesian argument, has important political impli-
cations. Maslow will be our guide for reinterpreting Hobbes’s conception of individuals,
and Maslow also lets us discuss Hobbes’s psychology in modern terminology. He will
help us trace the outlines of a political philosophy inspired by, but different from,
Hobbes’s own—a Hobbesian political philosophy. I use Maslow’s ideas to further develop
the conception of human nature provided by Hobbes, and I do not simultaneously examine
the possible consequences for Maslow’s theories.
My readings of Hobbes and Maslow are not based on a fundamental reinterpretation
of their texts by carefully examining the different contexts in which they lived and wrote.
I am not primarily interested in the historical factors that influenced their thoughts or the
way they expressed them. My main concern is to discover what is novel and timeless in
these thinkers, by which I refer to the parts of their philosophies that still influence our
thinking about politics and human nature. In so doing, I follow a Straussian approach to
the history of ideas (King, 1983, p. 16). I am, however, also aware of the need for caution
when I discuss and compare concepts from the present, Maslow’s time and Hobbes’s time
(Skinner, 1970, p. 138).
I read Hobbes in a way similar to that of Rapaczynski (1987), who emphasizes the
value of considering the texts of philosophers at face value, as handed down through
history, as this can provide valuable insight on our societies today; this involves some loss
of “narrow historical accuracy” and not being able to fully explain why the authors say the
things they do, with the exact words they use (Rapaczynski, 1987, p. 12). Minogue (1973)
follows a similar approach, as he considers Hobbes’s philosophy to be general, and not
exclusively the result of his times and circumstances. Eisenach (1989) encourages a break
with the departmentalized nature of the highly specialized Hobbes studies, and emphasizes
the value of finding new ways to understand the philosopher. I agree, and follow Rawls’s
(2007, p. 52) advice on trying to “make as much out of it [Leviathan] as you can and to
try to get a sense of how the overall view might go, if you put it in the best way.”
I will, however, consider the authors’ context at certain points in the article. Particularly
when it comes to the application of Maslow’s own psychological framework on himself and
Hobbes. While I show the authors to be quite similar, there are also important differences
between them. These can partly be explained by context. Hobbes lived in a time of civil war
and uncertainty, and writes like a man dominated by security needs. He even states that he was
“born a twin with Fear,” as he was born prematurely by a mother in fear of a war with the
Spanish (Martinich, 1995, p. 1). Maslow, on the other hand, who himself said he lived “a very
sheltered life” with all basic needs covered, focuses emphatically on the higher needs and
self-actualization (Maslow, 1973, p. 273). Smith (1973) describes this aspect of Maslow’s
philosophy, and implicitly compares it to the Hobbesian one:
Maslow’s is a psychology for the affluent, postindustrial society. The eons of protohuman
evolutionary history must all have been lived mainly at the lower Deficiency levels when life
was indeed nasty, brutish, and short. (Smith, 1973, p. 29)
However, why did I choose Maslow? First, I wanted to evaluate a single theorist
to be able to examine a coherent theory. Also, Maslow’s works are classics of
psychology, and he is widely known even outside his own discipline. Maslow was,
however, more than a psychologist; he was also a philosopher of both psychology and
science (Geiger, 1973). He discusses both the nature of psychology, and the nature of
























































































































(Geiger, 1973, p. xvii). Students of political science, economics and management will
all be familiar with Maslow and his hierarchy of needs. Maslow is also renowned, and
Esquire magazine—in their 50th anniversary edition—named him the mid-20th cen-
tury’s most influential psychologist and one of the most important contributors to the
modern understanding of human nature (Frager, 1987, p. 34). The most important
reason, however, is that his hierarchy of needs lets me reinterpret Hobbes’s psycho-
logical foundations, and this has important positive consequences for the relevance of
Hobbesian political philosophy in modern societies.
Maslow is also an interesting counterweight to Hobbes:
He was one of the foremost spokespersons of the humanistic or “Third Force” psychologies
[. . .] The book [Motivation and Personality] has had a tremendous influence in creating a
positive and whole view of human nature. (Frager, 1987, p. 33)
The portrayal of Hobbes as a negative philosopher who views people as “evil” is
highly dubious, and I will support my opposition to such a view by comparing him with
a theorist with a positive view of individuals. Maslow’s theory is positive, as he focuses
on human opportunities—not limits. His theory is also positive in that it is optimistic about
human nature and our situation. While Kohn (1999, 2008) claims that Maslow’s positivity
represents a break with the “bleak view of our species” offered by Hobbes, I here claim
that they are compatible. This compatibility implies that prevailing views about both
thinkers must be reappraised. Shaw and Colimore (1988) argue that Maslow started out
with “Rousseau-like optimism,” and that he moved toward “Hobbes-like cynicism.” I will
show that being Hobbes-like is not incompatible with being optimistic and positive about
human nature and potential.
To present a coherent version of Maslow’s ideas, I will mainly rely on Motivation &
Personality (Maslow, 1987), first published in 1954. I will, however, also use other
sources where these add important supplemental ideas, breadth, and/or nuance to
Maslow’s theory.
Despite what I perceive to be obvious and important similarities between the two
thinkers, the relationship between the two is not often explored in the literature on
Hobbes. Green (1993) is one of very few commentators on Hobbes who mention
Maslow, and he states that several parts of Hobbes’s psychology “received support
from Professor Abraham Maslow” (Green, 1993, pp. 128 –129). Efforts to use Maslow
to understand political development are also of interest, and Davies (1991) provides
one such example, without relating this to Hobbes. Fitzgerald’s (1977) collection of
essays on Human Needs and Politics is also peripherally related to my current
undertaking.
I structure the paper according to Maslow’s discussion of the basic needs and the
hierarchy into which they are grouped. My interpretation of Hobbes is interwoven in
this presentation, and I analyze the similarities and differences that I see between the
two philosophers. The elementary parts of Maslow’s and Hobbes’s theories of
motivation are well suited for comparison as they both discuss human needs and
human nature explicitly. After the initial presentation of Maslow’s hierarchy, I will
turn to his general theory of human nature, and then to the parts in Maslow’s theory
that I find incompatible, or not represented, in Hobbes’s philosophy. The differences,
and not just the similarities, are important. The implications of these differences will
prove to be quite significant for the construction of a modern Hobbesian philosophy
























































































































The Foundational Function of Hobbes’s Psychology
Before beginning, a few words regarding the function of Hobbesian psychology are in
order. Hobbes is considered the father of the reductionist, mechanist strand of modern
empirical psychology (Hearnshaw, 2020; Leijenhorst, 2007; Paganini, 2019). Because of
the constraints of an article such as this, I focus on the role of needs and motivation in
Hobbes’s psychology.
I will focus my analysis on Hobbes’s argument in Leviathan (1946), as my intent is
to show how a reinterpretation of parts of Hobbes’s philosophy involves changes in parts
linked to it. Hobbes’s analytical approach involves defining concepts, constructing prem-
ises and building a logical argument that shows how society must be ordered to achieve
just that—order.
I agree with Gauthier (1969) that Hobbes’s psychology is integral to an understanding
of his political philosophy. This view is also put forth by Brown (1959), as he criticizes
attempts to isolate and disregard Hobbesian psychology while keeping other parts of his
argument. Warrender (1957), Taylor (1989), and Oakeshott (1946) represent the ap-
proaches attacked by Brown (1959), and I here side with Brown.
Hobbes argues in favor of an absolutist, and preferably nondemocratic, state
because human beings function the way they do. Hobbes does not believe that human
beings are inherently evil, aggressive, or otherwise ill-inclined toward each other, as
I will later show. He does, however, state that their natures are such that without a
common power to bind them, there are three factors that lead them toward conflict.
This is competition for scarce resources, uncertainty about the intentions of others
(diffidence), and a desire for glory (Hobbes, 1946). The ultimate good is to avoid a
violent death, and apart from that Hobbes believes that a state should provide its
citizens with as much liberty and contentment as is compatible with the fundamental
requirements for security (Hobbes, 1946). Maslow’s description of security needs
implies a similar focus on security first, but when discussing the good society, he
describes one which “fosters the fullest development of human potentials,” and allows
for the achievement of what he calls being values (such as truth, goodness, beauty,
etc.) and the self-actualization of its citizens (Maslow, 1973, p. 7, 147, 221). However,
in his political writings, Maslow also clearly emphasizes the need for power and
authority. These, he states, can be “humanistic and transcendent” (Maslow, 1977, p.
6). I will not focus extensively on Maslow’s politics, as his psychology is most
important for my current agenda. Furthermore, Smith (1973, p. 30) also notes that
Maslow’s “thought was essentially unpolitical.”
As Hobbes builds his argument for a strong state on the way people are, human
nature and psychology are foundational elements of his political philosophy. This
notion is also supported by Maslow (1977), who states that the social and political can
be derived from the psychological and individual. It is also of interest that both
Hobbes and Maslow regarded introspection as an important source of knowledge of
human nature, and Geiger (1973, p. xiii) states that it is evident that Maslow “studied
himself”:
We must remember that knowledge of one’s own deep nature is also simultaneously knowl-
edge of human nature in general. (Maslow, 1973, pp. 115–116)
. . . whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth what he doth, when he does think, opine,
reason, hope, fear, &c. and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, what are the
























































































































The critics of Hobbes’s psychology argue that Hobbes’s argument rests on faulty
foundations. Instead of removing the foundations altogether, I show that some work on
these foundations—the aim of this article—changes and reinforces Hobbes’s political
philosophy, and renders it more relevant to modern society.
If we read the Leviathan (1946) as the construction of a logical argument regarding
political legitimacy, and not as a post hoc attempt to justify conclusions arrived at
independently, psychology matters. I read Hobbes in this manner, and although it might
be argued that the book is more of a rhetorical exercise than an honest attempt at finding
the best political system, his philosophy can be read as the latter. I argue that the result
is Hobbesian, and not Hobbes’s own.
Human Motivation and the Basic Needs
Maslow systematizes human beings’ basic needs in a hierarchy, and I will follow his
classification. Maslow begins with the physiological needs, followed by the need for
safety, the need for belongingness and love, the need for esteem, and finally the need for
self-actualization. (Maslow, 1987, p. 59)
The Physiological Needs
The foundation of Maslow’s pyramid is the physiological needs, and for Maslow,
these are the primary needs. Should a person be found wanting all the needs, these are the
ones we assume he will focus on to satisfy first:
The urge to write poetry, the desire to acquire an automobile, the interest in American history,
the desire for a new pair of shoes are, in the extreme case, forgotten or become of secondary
importance. For the human who is extremely and dangerously hungry, no other interests exist
but food. (Maslow, 1987, p. 58)
One interesting aspect of Maslow’s theory is his theory of the needs’ (needs in
general—not just the physiological needs) ability to dominate a person. According to
Maslow, we will not experience all the various needs equally strongly at the same time;
new needs take over when existing needs are satisfied. The most pressing need at any
moment can “take over” a person. “For our chronically and extremely hungry person,
Utopia can be defined simply as a place where there is plenty of food” (Maslow, 1987, p.
59). All the person’s goals and aspirations will revolve around food, and Maslow seems
to believe that such a person will imagine eternal happiness attained, should he only get
something to eat: “[l]ife itself tends to be defined in terms of eating. Anything else will
be defined as unimportant. Freedom, love, community feeling, respect, philosophy, may
all be waved aside as fripperies that are useless, since they fail to fill the stomach”
(Maslow, 1987, p. 59).
The idea that starving people seek food seems self-evident, and this is a representation
of the simplest form of motivation one can provide: a Darwinian wish for, and instinct for,
survival. Darwin also mentions reproduction as highly instinctual, which we might
interpret as survival more broadly—survival of our genes.
We have already come upon remarks that are relevant for Hobbes’s theory. Hobbes is
obviously aware of the fact that food is important, and he actually mentions it several
places. He mainly views physiological needs and “appetites” as natural, for example
























































































































these needs are appetites, but mostly aversions, “from somewhat they feel in their bodies”
(Hobbes, 1946, pp. 31, 32).
Hunger, according to Hobbes, is a need we share with all living beings. Animals,
however, have only these needs: “hunger, thirst, lust, and anger” (Hobbes, 1946, p. 15).
This is similar to Maslow’s observation that we “share the need for food with all living
things, the need for love with (perhaps) the higher apes, the need for self-actualization
with nobody. The higher the need the more specifically human it is” (Maslow, 1987, p.
99). Even more interesting is how precisely Hobbes anticipates the aspect of domination
in Maslow’s theory of needs, when he discusses some animals “in whom the appetite of
food, and other pleasures of sense, by predominance, take away the care of knowing
causes [. . .]” (Hobbes, 1946, p. 35). While the notions are similar to Maslow’s, Hobbes
does not present them as a complete theory. It appears that Hobbes views the appetites as
fundamentally the same, only separated by their strength, while Maslow thoroughly
separates them in his hierarchy—viewing them as substantially different. Hobbes also
emphasizes the fact that satisfying the fundamental needs—like getting food—can in
some circumstances be so time consuming that one does not get the opportunity to satisfy
other needs. In such cases the need may be present, but other needs are prioritized
(Hobbes, 1946, p. 103).
In his search for a good motivational theory, Maslow discards hunger as the universal
basis of motivation; he also discourages animal research. Maslow points out an important
connection between the focus on hunger and animal research: much of the focus on
hunger as a primary need is the result of research on rats—an animal he believes is mainly
motivated by physiological needs (Maslow, 1987, p. 59). In our modern society, people
will rarely experience the extreme frustration of physiological needs, and this makes the
“animal approach” to knowledge of human beings somewhat barren, in Maslow’s view
(Maslow, 1987, p. 59).
Maslow inherited a broader arsenal of existing knowledge than Hobbes. This is made
clear by his references to homeostasis as an explanation of how and why the body signals
certain physiological needs.1 Damasio (2018) emphasizes how important embodiment is
for cognition, and this is now even used to make machines that better imitate human
emotions (Man & Damasio, 2019). Appetites are to a certain degree likened to a direct
manifestation of the body’s actual physical needs (Maslow, 1987, p. 59; Myers, 2003, p.
457). One cannot expect Hobbes to argue these matters in our modern terminology, but it
appears he had also approximated this insight:
This motion, which is called appetite, and for the appearance of it delight, and pleasure,
seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion, and a help thereunto; and, therefore, such things
as caused delight, were not improperly called jucunda, aà juvando, from helping or fortifying.
(Hobbes, 1946, p. 33)
The Safety Needs
The idea of a fundamental need for safety is extremely important in Hobbes’s
philosophy. The implications of these needs are the basis of Hobbes’s whole political
philosophy. Maslow describes the safety needs as consisting of the following elements:
1 The body is automatically working towards a constant blood flow, and needs certain amounts
























































































































[. . . ] (security; stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear, anxiety, and chaos; need
for structure, order, law, and limits; strength in the protector; and so on; Maslow, 1987, p. 60).
These elements are obviously very familiar to Hobbes. Maslow notes that these needs
also have the ability to dominate:
Again, as in the hungry human, we find that the dominating goal is a strong determinant not
only of their current world outlook and philosophy but also of their philosophy of the future
and of values. Practically everything looks less important than safety and protection (even
sometimes the physiological needs, which, being satisfied, are now underestimated). A person
in this state, if it is extreme enough and chronic enough, may be characterized as living almost
for safety alone. (Maslow, 1987, p. 60)
The state of nature, according to Hobbes, is characterized by the lack of safety, as life
there is an exercise in “continual fear, and danger of violent death” (Hobbes, 1946, p. 82).
Whether or not a violent death is the worst of evils—as Hobbes believes it to be—may be
left undetermined for now, but we should be able to assume that it most certainly appears
to be the greatest evil for someone dominated by safety needs. Hobbes himself, as
mentioned, lived in a situation of great turmoil and civil war, and with the various shifts
of power he was attacked as a royalist, an atheist, and subsequently even portrayed as a
traitor to the royalist cause he had been despised for being a part of (Collins, 2005). We
could easily imagine that living in such a situation would lead a person to be dominated
by safety needs.
Maslow goes on to explain how uncertainty manifests itself in people’s wants and
goals. One interesting point is that Maslow thinks that safety needs often bring forth a
strong wish for “a protector, or a stronger person or system, on whom they may depend”
and an “easier acceptance of dictatorship or of military rule” (Maslow, 1987, p. 61).
Hobbes’s ideas will most likely be quite attractive for such a person. Threats to safety are
not exclusive to a situation of war, but consist in “real threats to law, to order, to the
authority of society” (Maslow, 1987, p. 61). This would seem to encompass Hobbes’s
state of nature, which does not necessarily consist only of open warfare, but of a known
inclination for it (Hobbes, 1946, p. 82). Schwartz (1983) also states that there are great
similarities between the security needs stage and Hobbes’s state of nature.
The similarities between Maslow and Hobbes on these points are quite extraordinary,
and it seems justifiable to conclude that they would most likely agree that the safety needs
are of paramount importance for any theory of human nature.
Safety needs, like the physiological needs, are rarely severely frustrated in peaceful,
modern societies, according to Maslow. This leads people to downplay their importance,
and “forget” how important safety is. Thus, the ideas of the person dominated by safety
needs appear quite foreign, and maybe even detestable, to individuals who have moved on
to the higher needs (Maslow, 1987, p. 75, 82, 179). This issue is not satisfactorily dealt
with by Hobbes, as his state of nature is not what we would refer to as a modern and
peaceful society.
The Belongingness and Love Needs
When it comes to the needs for belonging and love, the following quote from Fromm
is an indication that these needs should under no circumstances be disregarded:
The physiologically conditioned needs are not the only imperative part of man’s nature. There
























































































































essence of the human mode and practice of life: the need to be related to the world outside
oneself, the need to avoid aloneness. To feel completely alone and isolated leads to mental
disintegration just as physical starvation leads to death. (Fromm, 1994, p. 17)
Hobbes writes little about the need for belongingness; especially if it is to be
considered an isolated need. However, Oved (2017) discusses Maslow’s love needs, and
points to the centrality of belonging and interpersonal relationships in Hobbes’s philos-
ophy. Sagar (2019) also notes that Hobbes is often associated with a “popularized
caricature” of people’s social needs and implies that a proper reading of Hobbes is one
where the importance of human sociability is present, even though they are characterized
by a “natural unsociability.” Hobbes emphasizes the need for sociability in terms of
mutual accommodation (Fortier, 2018). Slomp (2019) discusses Hobbes’s view of friend-
ship, which is important in his philosophy, despite Hobbes’s criticism of the view that
friendship is something beyond political reach.
Maslow considers these needs to be very important, and is of the opinion that we far
too often underestimate, or overlook, them; “[w]e have largely forgotten our deep animal
tendencies to herd, to flock, to join, to belong” (Maslow, 1987, p. 62). It is worthy of note
that Hobbes discusses groups and alliances, but mainly as pertaining to their instrumental
value as means to power and safety (Hobbes, 1946, p. 56).
Moving on to love (that Maslow points out is not the same as sex), the overlap of
Maslow and Hobbes becomes greater; while Hobbes does not discuss these needs at
length, he does emphasize their importance:
Of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own life, and limbs; and
in the next degree, in most men, those that concern conjugal affection; and after them, riches
and means of living. (Hobbes, 1946, p. 223)
That conjugal affection is mentioned before riches and means of living should give us
a clear indication that Hobbes recognized the importance of these needs, or feelings. It is,
however, important to note that the nature and expectations of marriage was very different
in the ages of Hobbes and Maslow, as marriage increasingly become a means of satisfying
higher needs, while in “the marriages of yesteryear,” marriage was important to satisfy the
physiological and safety needs (Finkel, Hui, Carswell, & Larson, 2014).
Hobbes describes the individual in as much detail as necessary to fully explain his
theory of the state, and these needs may, to him, seem less central with regard to their
political implications. It is also important to note that there is little to justify a claim that
Hobbes believed in self-less love (Crisp, 2019). Maslow, on the other hand, refers to such
self-less love as being love. This kind of love is characterized by being “so great and so
pure (unambivalent) for the object itself that its good is what we want, not what it can do
for us” (Maslow, 1973, p. 147–8). Deficiency love is Maslow’s term for the more practical
and self-oriented kind of love that is more akin to Hobbes’s approach to the concept
(Maslow, 1973).
The Esteem Needs
The esteem needs are strongly represented in Hobbes’s philosophy:
And from hence it is, that kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavors to the assuring
it at home by laws, or abroad by wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire;
























































































































admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability in their mind.
(Hobbes, 1946, p. 64)
In this quote, we can see that Hobbes anticipates the dynamics that Maslow develops
with regard to needs following the satisfaction of other needs. Their wordings of these
issues are also quite similar:
All people in our society (with a few pathological exceptions) have a need or desire for a
stable, firmly based, usually high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect or self-esteem, and
for the esteem of others. (Maslow, 1987, p. 63)
Lastly, considering what value men are naturally apt to set upon themselves; what respect they
look for from others; and how little they value other men; from whence continually arise
among them, emulation, quarrels, factions, and at last war, to the destroying of one another,
and diminution of their strength against a common enemy [. . .]. (Hobbes, 1946, p. 118)
Maslow points to “the desire for reputation or prestige (defining it as respect or esteem
from other people), status, fame and glory, dominance, recognition, attention, importance,
dignity, or appreciation” (Maslow, 1987, p. 63). He believes that many, including Freud,
have missed the importance of these needs. Others, like Alfred Adler, emphasized them
strongly, and Maslow saw a current strong tendency toward proper recognition of these
needs (Maslow, 1987, p. 63).
Hobbes regards the needs for recognition and respect (honor) as so crucial that he
named it one of the three principal causes of conflict (Hobbes, 1946, p. 81). Sætra (2009)
has shown in some detail how a need for honor can easily lead to violence when
recognition and respect is seen as lacking (Sætra, 2009, Section 2.4.6). Maslow does not
connect these needs to conflict and violence, but one could perhaps claim that the severe
frustration of needs in general could easily lead to such consequences.
The Self-Actualization Needs
We should never have the desire to compose music or create mathematical systems, or to
adorn our homes, or to be well dressed if our stomachs were empty most of the time, or if we
were continually dying of thirst, or if we were continually threatened by an always-impending
catastrophe, or if everyone hated us. (Maslow, 1987, p. 49)
If people were to pick one of Maslow’s central concepts and use it to describe his
psychology, self-actualization would probably be a popular choice. Maslow regards
“psychologically healthy” and self-actualizing individuals as his ideal, and large parts of
his works focus on achieving this. His inspiration for examining self-actualization was two
of his teachers, Ruth Benedict and Max Wertheimer, whom he greatly admired (Maslow,
1973). These people are presumably gratified in all the needs discussed thus far, and are
both physically and mentally safe, have a full social life, and “have status and place in life
and respect from other people,” along with a feeling of self-worth and self-respect
(Maslow, 1973, p. 313). Wilson (1972) describes how Maslow presents a break with
traditional psychology in his insistence on studying healthy, instead of sick, people.
Maslow’s self-actualizing individuals are not geniuses like Mozart, but regular people
who develop their talents and do what they are good at (Maslow, 1987, p. 200).
Self-actualizing persons are creative, open and “healthy” individuals—“good animals” is
Maslow’s phrase for their natural goodness; many geniuses, “Wagner, for example, or
Van Gogh or Degas or Byron,” were obviously not psychologically healthy (Maslow,
























































































































thing outside of themselves, and this is the search for being values—“the ultimate values
which are intrinsic, which cannot be reduced to anything more ultimate” (Maslow, 1973,
p. 43).
This focus on self-actualization is not reflected in Hobbes. However, Hobbes’s
recognition of, for example, arts and sciences as fundamental reasons for founding and
uniting the state, could be argued to be of importance here:
Desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclineth men to obey a common power: for such
desire, containeth a desire for leisure; and consequently protection from some other power
than their own. (Hobbes, 1946, p. 64)
Hobbes and Maslow both see the connection between peace and these “higher”
activities, and deny the possibility of these things existing in any significant degree where
the lower needs dominate.
The merely surviving person will not worry much over the higher things of life, the study of
geometry, the right to vote, civic pride, respect; he or she is primarily concerned with more
basic goods. (Maslow, 1987, p. 83)
Desire, to know why, and how, curiosity; such as is in no living creature but man: so that man
is distinguished, not only by his reason, but also by this singular passion from other animals;
in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by predominance, take away the
care of knowing causes [. . .]. (Hobbes, 1946, p. 35)
The claim that war, and in particular civil war, is the utmost evil, can be justified,
according to Maslow, by more than the fear of death alone—a conclusion that also seems
natural to Hobbes.
Hobbes seems to realize that people have a need to unfold beyond what is required for
ensuring their daily subsistence. While Maslow thinks the need for self-actualization only
manifests itself when other, more fundamental, needs are satisfied, Hobbes proposes that
this need is ever present in that it is in fact a reason to found the state. I will also note that
Maslow sees self-actualizing—or psychologically healthy—people as a political neces-
sity, as such people are friendly, tolerant, sociable, helping, and trustworthy. They are, he
continues, necessary for “any viable political, social, economic system” (Maslow, 1973,
p. 101; Maslow, 1977).
Level Dynamics
The “lower” four levels are often labeled deficiency needs, as they relate to physical
and social survival, while self-actualization is considered a growth need (Passer & Smith,
2004, p. 328). When one moves upward in the hierarchy, one experiences need progres-
sion, but if a previously satisfied need is unsatisfied, we regress to the lowest unsatisfied
need (Passer & Smith, 2004, p. 328). Maslow’s hierarchy has met much criticism, along
with praise; self-actualization is seen as “vague and hard to measure” and the ordering can
appear arbitrary; how does one, for example, account for people enduring severe physical
pain, such as prisoners of war do to protect their friends and so forth? Does the thirst for
knowledge only become pressing after the previous levels are fulfilled (Passer & Smith,
2004, p. 372)?
There are obviously legitimate points to be raised regarding Maslow’s theory, but
Passer and Smith (2004, p. 372) points to the theory’s value as an inspiration for
further thinking in various fields “[d]espite these drawbacks, by calling attention to the
























































































































out that Maslow’s theory was meant to apply to “average people,” and that exceptions,
such as the starving artist, can easily be found, without this having a major impact on
the theory as such (Larsen & Buss, 2010, p. 351). Much research has been done on the
validity of Maslow’s theory, with diverse results (Larsen & Buss, 2010, p. 352). While
some support the main tenets of the theory, others, like Wahba and Bridwell (1976)
find little evidence of the theory in the studies they examine (Larsen & Buss, 2010,
p. 352). They are focused on testing Maslow in the work situation, however, and the
research they examine is statistical, excluding clinical methodology (Wahba &
Bridwell, 1976, p. 213).
Tay and Diener (2011) conducted an empirical study of needs, based on Maslow’s
theory, with a sample from 123 countries. They found “evidence of universality,” and
“that the needs tend to be achieved in a certain order,” lending some empirical evidence
to Maslow’s level dynamics. As they say, “our analyses reveal that as hypothesized by
Maslow (1973), people tend to achieve basic and safety needs before other needs” (Tay
& Diener, 2011, p. 363). Taormina and Gao (2013) also found strong support for the
“validity and reliability of all 5 needs measures” developed from Maslow’s theory and
also to the dynamics of Maslow’s hierarchy.
The exactness of the dynamics of progression and regression is not crucial for my use
of Maslow’s ideas as a way to broaden Hobbes’s psychology. Maslow himself noted that
long-lasting frustration of a need may cause a fixation on that need, and that higher needs
can in fact be activated by “long deprivation, renunciation, or suppression of lower needs”
in some cases (Wahba & Bridwell, 1976, p. 214). The nonexact nature of the hierarchy is
also noted by Smith (1973, p. 20). However, if some will pursue the higher needs even
while lower ones are frustrated, this will, if anything, render Hobbes’s original conclu-
sions even more questionable.
The importance of the lower needs, which is generally not questioned, is in itself
sufficient for the conclusions arrived at in this article. The highest need—self-
actualization—has received more criticism than the other levels. It is also the level that is
least represented in Hobbes, and I have chosen not to focus specifically on this need.
Smith (1973) provides a compelling critique of the robustness of Maslow’s thoughts on
self-actualization, and in particular on the methods Maslow used to arrive at his conclu-
sions on these issues.
Therefore, while I do not assume the infallibility of Maslow, I join Myers (2003, p.
458) in viewing the “simple idea that some motives are more compelling than others” as
a useful framework for dealing with human motivation.
What makes Maslow’s theory of motivation dynamic is the interaction of the various
needs within individuals (Larsen & Buss, 2010, p. 334). Despite the absence of the levels
in his work, Hobbes does seem to portray human motivation as dynamic, in that there will
at various times be different wants and desires that motivate people; there is an important
similarity between Hobbes’s central concept of felicity and Maslow’s view pertaining to
the satisfaction of needs:
But what happens to their desires when there is plenty of bread and when their bellies are
chronically filled? [. . .] at once other (and higher) needs emerge and these, rather than
physiological hungers, dominate the organism. And when these in turn are satisfied, again new
(and still higher) needs emerge, and so on. (Maslow, 1987, p. 59)
Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the
























































































































“Contentment,” Maslow states, “is for practically all people a transient state,” and a
search for permanent contentment is useless (Maslow, 1973, p. 228; Maslow, 1973). A
central difference between the two, is that, according to Maslow, one systematically
changes what one seeks after satisfying one need, while Hobbes does not predict a specific
pattern in this change. This provides us with the first point of major importance that will
need to be evaluated: Maslow’s individuals can be said to change fundamentally over
time, with regards to desires and needs, and there is some “end station.” For Hobbes, the
continual change is cyclic and more unpredictable. Both conceptions are indeed dynamic,
but the structure introduced by Maslow carries implications for Hobbes’s argument, as we
will later see.
Human Nature
What was Maslow’s view on human nature? First of all, he discards the “egoism-
altruism” dichotomy. Sætra (2009) argues that Hobbes does the same; Hobbesian people
are self-interested, but this does not exclude the possibility of altruism, as they could gain
pleasure from being “good”; they could gain pleasure from seeing another person’s
happiness, and so forth “Even Hobbes,” Kohn (2008, my italics) states, is not a “strict
psychological egoist.”
This is also argued by Gert (1965, 1967). McNeilly’s (1966) position is that Hobbes
was inconsistent, and that he moved from something akin to psychological egoism in his
earlier work to rejecting this in later works like Leviathan. Hobbes is at times portrayed
as a proponent of the view that we are little more than selfish animals—a crude and
erroneous account of Hobbes’s psychology (Minogue, 1973). Green (2019) discusses
Hobbes’s “fuller” theory of human nature as opposed to the “familiar” attribution of
psychological egoism to Hobbes. See also Kavka (1986) for a discussion of what sort of
egoism, if any, Hobbes represents.
Hobbes and Maslow seem to agree on the fact that while people are self-interested, this
does not imply that they are egoists in a negative and exclusively self-regarding sense
(Sætra, 2009, Section 2.4.3, 2.6; Maslow, 1987, pp. 81, 101, 191).
If our instinctlike impulses, for instance, to love, arrange it so that we get more personal
“selfish” pleasure from watching our children eat a special treat than from eating it ourself,
then how shall we define “selfish” and how differentiate it from “unselfish”? (Maslow, 1987,
p. 101)
Frager (1987) quotes Maslow as saying that human history is a long story in which
human nature has been underestimated: “History has practically always sold human nature
short” (Maslow, 1987, p. 158). Regarding our positive potential, Maslow thinks that this
has always been overlooked, and that a correction of this neglect is needed. (Frager, 1987,
p. 7)
For inscrutable reasons that only the intellectual historian may be able to unravel, Western
civilization has generally believed that the animal in us is a bad animal, and that our most
primitive impulses are evil, greedy, selfish, and hostile. (Maslow, 1987, p. 92)
Maslow disagrees strongly with this understanding of the individual—“the animal.”
“Original sin” is not a term used by Maslow, and he thinks that Darwin, among others, is
























































































































our commonality with animals is the tendency to see competition in all aspects of human
life, and to overlook the vast amount of cooperation that is equally striking.
Maslow traces this exaggerated emphasis to our tendency to do research on animals,
and, somewhat uncritically, to transfer the results to human beings. By examining wolves
or rats in our search for human nature, for example, it is natural to conclude that we are
both mean and brutal, while we may in fact be different from these animals in some
respects (Maslow, 1987, p. 92). This is what Koestler refers to as ratomorphy, and the
consequences of misunderstanding humans by comparing us to animals are still being
discussed (Koestler, 1967). Today, these discussions are often related to usage of the
machine-metaphor for understanding human beings (Kohler, 2010; Sætra, 2020).
Shaw and Colimore (1988) portray Maslow as a contrast to Hobbes and others who
view individuals as “inherently destructive.” Jastrzębski (2011) also portrays Hobbes as a
contrast to Maslow, as he argues that Maslow’s view of human nature is based on
Rousseau and Locke, while Hobbes represents a more negative view of human nature as
corrupt. Freud, but not Maslow, he argues, can be considered a follower of Hobbes
regarding human nature (Jastrzębski, 2011). I argue that such a reading of Hobbes is
dubitable. However, Maslow himself was perhaps not the greatest fan of Hobbes, as he,
in one of his letters, states that he, in his private world, spent time “getting mad at Locke
and Hobbes,” while only appearing to live in the world of other living human beings
(Geiger, 1973, p. xix).
Maslow heavily emphasizes that we should not call the unconscious elements of
human psychology sick, evil, selfish, or beastly (Maslow, 1973, p. 95). The integrated
person consists of both the conscious and the rational, and it is necessary that we avail
ourselves to both elements (Maslow, 1973). These two elements, and traits such as
aggression, are available in all healthy individuals, but the “quality of aggression
changes” as we move from psychological immaturity to self-actualization (Maslow, 1973,
p. 226).
Hobbes states that people do not derive joy from, for example, killing others. This goes
generally, but exceptions do exist, and it seems reasonable to assume that Hobbes to a
certain degree refers to something akin to psychopaths in his most negative passages about
individuals. As we can see in the following, Hobbes is quoted as saying “some men” are
like psychopaths, and there is nothing in Hobbes’s texts that implies that he assumes all
individuals to be of this kind.
It is helpful in understanding psychopaths to assume that they have no love identifications
with other human beings and can hurt them or even kill them casually, without hate, and
without pleasure, precisely as they kill animals who have come to be pests. (Maslow, 1987,
p. 129)
Thomas Hobbs said that if it were not for the gallowes, some men are of so cruell a nature as
to take a delight in killing men more than I should to kill a bird (Aubrey, 1999, p. 157).
For, that any man should take pleasure in other men’s great harms, without other end of his
own, I do not conceive it possible. (Hobbes, 1946, p. 37)
It is also important to make a clear distinction between regarding human nature as evil
and realizing that human nature may have “evil” consequences. Maslow was nonsenti-
mental, and in no way neglected the evil consequences of bad people, or societies (Geiger,
1973). Maslow (1977, p. 6) even calls he political philosophy “humanistic realism at the
B-level.” While Smith (1973, p. 27) criticizes Maslow for being too Dionysian, Maslow
























































































































are, he states “too exclusively Dionysian,” and neglect the importance of rationality,
power, and authority (Maslow, 1977, pp. 5–6).
Hobbes shows, in his example of the man who travels armed, locks his doors, and even
in his own house locks his coffers, that we all, like Hobbes himself, implicitly say that
other people cannot be fully trusted; but he is equally clear on the point that “neither of
us accuse man’s nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no
sin” (Hobbes, 1946, p. 83). Gauthier (1969, p. 17) makes the same point when, in his
examination of the war “of every man, against every man,” he shows that this is a result
of people’s uncertainty in the state of nature, and their natural desire for survival;
“Hobbes’s metaphor is grossly misunderstood if it is thought to show man’s natural
malevolence and evil.”
It can certainly be granted by now that our knowledge is sufficient to reject any claim that
human nature is, in its essence, primarily, biologically, fundamentally evil, sinful, malicious,
ferocious, cruel, or murderous. But we do not dare to say there are no instinctlike tendencies
at all to bad behavior. (Maslow, 1987, p. 124)
Hobbes and Maslow agree on the notion that there are some antisocial beings, while
most individuals are not driven by “evil.” Still, even good men may be driven to
competition and conflict (Hobbes, 1946). Maslow also readily agrees that one “can set up
social institutions which will guarantee that individuals will be at each other’s throats”
(Maslow, 1973, p. 221). In short, Maslow knew very well that “human nature generates
evil without itself being intrinsically evil” (Maslow, 1977, p. 17).
Instincts, Rationality, and the Good
Instinct, which we can define rigidly as a motivational unit in which the drive, motivated
behavior, and the goal object or the goal effect are all appreciably determined by heredity.
(Maslow, 1987, p. 51)
Maslow views instincts as an integral part of human beings, and since instinct seems to be
invariably connected to human nature, it appears that he did not view these instincts as
something negative. We have examined the body’s instinctive tendency to ensure its own
health, for example, during the discussion of the physiological needs above, and I concluded
that both Hobbes and Maslow view such instincts as natural, and positive, for the organism in
question. Maslow also points out that almost every theoretical school in “psychiatry, psycho-
analysis, clinical psychology, social work, or child therapy has had to postulate some doctrine
of instinct-like needs no matter how much they disagreed on every other point” (Maslow,
1987, p. 89). Full realization of the self, Maslow says, requires taking the “total human
personality” into account, and this “includes the active expression not only of the intellectual
but also the emotional and instinct-like capacities” (Maslow, 1987, p. 158).
Maslow considers the complete human being, and because instincts are a natural part
of an individual, it is allowed the same value as, for example, reason. This clearly
separates Maslow from, for example, Aristotle, who places human abilities in a hierarchy
with rationality on top (Maslow, 1987, p. 158). Based on this, a natural dichotomy is
created, where rationality and feelings/instincts are portrayed as conflicting phenomena.
This, according to Maslow, is wrong, and these aspects of human nature turn out to be
more complementary than conflicting (Maslow, 1987, p. 158). Reason and “instinct-like
impulses” are seen by Maslow as working toward a common goal, at least in the healthy
























































































































as development leads to a fusion, and transcendence, of the duality (Maslow, 1973, p.
218). Hobbes uses the term endeavor, or conatus, to describe the infinitesimal internal
workings of our bodies, that are the foundations of such things as fear, thirst, and
hunger—the unconscious origin of what we later perceive as our desires and appetites
(Martinich, 1995). This is a natural and vital part of Hobbes’s psychology. When
discussing synergy Maslow also speaks of conatus, and “the synergic working or fusing
of cognition and conation” in organisms, demonstrated by, for example, homeostasis,
described by Cannon as the “‘wisdom’ of the body” (Maslow, 1973, p. 219).
Maslow disagreeing with Aristotle is something we can easily assume would please
Hobbes, considering his strong antipathy toward “the vain and erroneous philosophy, of
the Greeks, especially Aristotle” (Hobbes, 1946, p. 398).2 It is, however, mainly Aristo-
tle’s political doctrine that is explicitly considered in Leviathan, not the opinions on
instincts and reason. Hobbes never uses the word “instinct” in Leviathan, but he discusses
natural inclinations of mankind—a term I claim to be equivalent to a broad usage of the
term instinct (Hobbes, 1946, p. 465). In De Cive, he explains how individuals, by an
“impulsion of nature,” seeks to remove themselves from death:
For every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the
chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no
less than that whereby a stone moves downward. It is neither absurd nor reprehensible, neither
against the dictates of true reason, for a man to use all his endeavors to preserve and defend
his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows. (Hobbes, 2005, p. 8)
Human beings naturally desire to survive, and the laws of nature—that are laws of
reason—are the means to achieving this wherever men are thrust together; there is no
fundamental conflict between instincts and “true reason” in Hobbes’s philosophy.3
Animals having strong instincts seems to be beyond debate, and this, according to
Maslow, is one of the reasons for portraying instinct and rationality as conflicting. By
conducting research on animals, and assuming that the same instincts we find there are
also present in human beings, we are making a big mistake, especially since we are then
often identifying ourselves with animals such as “wolves, tigers, pigs, vultures, or snakes,
rather than with better, or at least milder, animals like the deer, elephant, dog, or
chimpanzee” (Maslow, 1987, p. 92). Furthermore, Maslow claims that our instincts are far
weaker than those found in animals; we are not controlled exclusively by impulses, the
way some animals can be claimed to be (Maslow, 1987, p. 91). Our instincts are different
from that of a vulture, and Maslow also believes them to be milder (Maslow, 1987, p. 92).
Regarding the good, we find many points of agreement between Maslow and Hobbes.
In particular, the fundamental acceptance of the organisms’ own desires as the basis for
determining what is good (Maslow, 1987, p. 102).4 For Hobbes, this is the very definition
2 “And I believe that scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy, than that
which now is called Aristotle’s Metaphysics; nor more repugnant to government, than much of that he
hath said in his Politics; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethics” (Hobbes, 1946, p. 439).
3 Neither is it the same, but, as for Maslow, there is often some complementarity involved.
4 “It may be objected by the technical philosopher ‘How can you prove that it is better to be happy
than unhappy?’ Even this question can be answered empirically, for if we observe human beings under
sufficiently wide conditions, we discover that they, they themselves, not the observer, choose spontane-
ously to be happy rather than unhappy, comfortable rather than pained, serene rather than anxious. In a

























































































































of the good for someone in a state of nature, and Maslow goes a long way along the road
of agreement. The fact that individuals’ instincts are understood as something positive—
something promoting the good—leads to the recommendation of a state that ensures the
best possible results from instincts being allowed to flourish; “[i]f our intrinsic impulses
are understood to be admirable rather than detestable, we shall certainly wish to free them
for their fullest expression rather than to bind them into straightjackets” (Maslow, 1987,
p. 103).
Hobbes and Aristotle actually agree on the fact that people’s own evaluations are the
basis for determining what is good in the state of nature. In a state, however, the law
defines what is good, according to Hobbes; this is because of the fact that law exists to
secure the goals of the state, which are, to Hobbes, identical with men’s goals (Hobbes,
1946, p. 446).
The Hobbslow Synthesis
Humans and Their Needs
We have established that Hobbes discusses human needs in detail. He also quite
clearly understands that needs, when frustrated, can dominate a person. What we have
found to be lacking is the organization of human needs in a hierarchy, and this is where
the synthesis of Hobbes and Maslow really becomes interesting.
For Hobbes, the need for security is ever present, and while he portrays people’s life
as an endless succession of pursuits of what they desire, what they desire is assumed to
be based on a desire for power as a means to ensure survival. Freedom, love, belonging,
self-realization, and so forth never really take center stage in Hobbes’s individuals.
Maslow’s individuals, on the other hand, at times of experienced security, are assumed to
live almost exclusively for the satisfaction of these higher needs. If Maslow was right,
what are the implications for Hobbes’s argument?
The propensity of needs to dominate individuals, with Maslow’s hierarchy in mind,
could have important implications for Hobbes’s general theory. For the moment, let us
assume that people exposed to great uncertainty and threats of war or other forms of
violence, would wish for, and happily accept, Hobbes’s prescribed state. “Splendid idea,
Hobbes! We want your Sovereign to protect us from the evils of chaos and civil war!”,
people could easily be assumed to reason in the natural state. What then, when the
Sovereign, with the absolute authority his subjects have happily bestowed on him, has
established his commonwealth? Will the same people march to the streets, yelling
“Tyrant! You fooled us! We demand liberty!”?
What people desperately long for in the state of nature—the reason they made the state
in the first place and constructed it after Hobbesian ideals—is forgotten and replaced by
the (sometimes desperate) desire to fulfil other, and higher, needs. It does not seem
far-fetched to imagine that these individuals would now feel hoodwinked into making a
bad state that focuses far too much (as they now see it) on security and order.
Hobbes and the Higher Needs
Hobbes’s lack of focus on the higher needs leads me to propose a refinement of
Hobbes’s view of human nature, with a view to improving his whole philosophy. Needs
for autonomy, participation, self-realization, and so forth will also need to be examined to
























































































































is the possible “need” for freedom. Maslow claims that there are certain prerequisites for
the satisfaction of all our needs:
Such conditions as freedom to speak, freedom to do what one wishes so long as no harm is
done to others, freedom to express oneself, freedom to investigate and seek information,
freedom to defend oneself, justice, fairness, honesty, and orderliness in the group are examples
of such preconditions for basic need satisfaction. (Maslow, 1987, p. 64)
He goes on to say that “[s]ecrecy, censorship, dishonesty, and blocking of commu-
nication threaten all the basic needs” (Maslow, 1987, p. 65). It is a bit simpler for Hobbes:
men choose survival over freedom, should they be forced to choose. Because Hobbes
thinks that censorship, for example, is required to properly secure men’s life and health,
it would be absurd for Hobbes to claim that this censorship would at the same time prevent
people from feeling safe and feeding themselves. This may, however, be too simple,
considering the fact that people not dominated by safety needs would not necessarily agree
with, or even understand, Hobbes’s line of reasoning. One could claim that they should
agree with it, but Maslow seems to think that the fact that people “forget” that such needs
are important, once they’re satisfied, is one of the primary reasons for disorder and
conflict:
I have also become convinced that getting used to our blessings is one of the most important
nonevil generators of human evil, tragedy, and suffering. What we take for granted we
undervalue, and we are apt to sell a valuable birthright for a mess of pottage, leaving behind
regret, remorse, and a lowering of self-esteem. (Maslow, 1987, p. 179)
Do we really have a need for freedom? Maslow leans on clinical data when he states
that people that “have known true freedom (not paid for by giving up safety and security
but rather built on the basis of adequate safety and security) will not willingly or easily
allow their freedom to be taken away from them. However, we do not know for sure that
this is true for people born into slavery” (Maslow, 1987, p. 63n). He states the same in
Maslow (1977). For our purposes, we will assume that men in modern society have
experienced the kind of freedom Maslow describes here.
More important than the discussion of whether or not freedom is a basic human need
is that men seem to value freedom higher than security in certain situations. This insight
can be implemented in a Hobbesian theory that refines the model of human nature that
serves as the basis for the rest of the argument. The implications of this revision are quite
important and lead to a somewhat milder end to Hobbes’s political argument—a state that
is not as extreme regarding security, and not quite as frivolous about freedom and the
higher human needs (Sætra, 2009).
The Beginnings of a Modern Hobbesian Theory
The office of the sovereign, be it a monarch or an assembly, consisteth in the end, for which
he was trusted with the sovereign power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people.
(Hobbes, 1946, p. 219)
First of all, Hobbes states that the end of the commonwealth is the “good of the
people” (Hobbes, 1946, p. 116, 219). Maslow might add and to foster good people, and

























































































































Hobbes states that what is good for men is entirely subjective. This is also an inclusive
notion, implying that everyone’s opinions matter. Maslow (1977) agrees that politics is to
be informed by, and reach, everyone, regardless of education and intellectual level, and it
is the role of everyone to provide the values of politics. Hobbes also assumes that survival
and the absence of the fear for a sudden and violent death are shared by all to such a degree
that they can be perceived as objective goods with priority.
Another crucial point to keep in mind is that Hobbes is a man with an extreme dislike
for taking risks, especially when it comes to the stability of the state. Maslow (1977, p. 17)
also states that while permissiveness is desirable in general, we must be “extremely firm
and unyielding about ultimate and intrinsic values.” In addition, states must be built to last.
And lasting cannot possibly be construed as “long enough to secure my own personal
survival until I die of natural causes” for any single person. Hobbes believes it should be
built to last as long as mankind (Hobbes, 1946, p. 209).
[S]o, long time after men have begun to constitute commonwealths, imperfect, and apt to
relapse into disorder, there may principles of reason be found out, by industrious meditation,
to make their constitution, excepting by external violence, everlasting. (Hobbes, 1946, p. 220)
This leads to the conclusion that to achieve what Hobbes perceives as the objective
good—the good of the people, in the shape of a state that secures them—he may have to
consider the subjective needs of people living in that secure state.
While the worst evil in the state of nature is assumed to be death, people living safely
under the protection of the sovereign can be assumed to regard their lack of freedom as
the worst evil imaginable. Such people would presumably try to improve their situations,
which must lead to opposition to a Hobbesian sovereign. Should that be the case, it can
easily be argued that the most secure state is not one that is built exclusively upon
satisfying the needs felt by people in a prestate condition.
The most secure state is one that can initially handle and suppress the conflict that
precedes it, while subsequently providing a condition that is bearable for those who forget
the “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” condition they have perhaps never experi-
enced (Hobbes, 1946, p. 82). Thus, we begin to see the outlines of a Hobbesian theory
where liberalism, and perhaps even democracy, have crucial functions for the very
stability and order that Hobbes so values. If Maslow was right about the political necessity
of fostering self-actualization this is yet another reason for the creation of a liberal
government (Maslow, 1973, p. 100). At least if we believe that self-actualization requires
a certain extent of liberty, and perhaps even the possibility to take part in governing one’s
own society. In Politics 3, Maslow (1977) argues that human beings have need for
involvement, expressing themselves (and being heard), as he shows how a decentralized,
participatory liberal democracy is best equipped to fulfil such needs. It is, however, a
balanced liberalism, and he is, as noted, a realist, acknowledging the need for power and
authority, extreme firmness when necessary, and the need to balance liberty with what is
required for the functioning of society (Maslow, 1977, pp. 6, 12, 17). Fortier (2018)
believes that Hobbesian liberalism is a “a crucial contribution to understanding the theory
and practice of liberal politics.” I argue that this is definitely the case for the Hobbesian
theory I here propose, which also elucidates the value of liberalism.
Hobbes’s prescription of monarchy as the preferred form of government was nothing
but prudential, and should modern representative democracy prove to be more stable,
Hobbes’s stated goal for the government would lead him to choose that form of rule
























































































































The difference between these three kinds of commonwealth, consisteth not in the difference
of power; but in the difference of convenience, or aptitude to produce the peace, and security
of the people; for which end they were instituted. (Hobbes, 1946, p. 122)
One of Hobbes’s main arguments in favor of the rule of one was that he believes
this secured the best alignment of interest between the ruler and the ruled (Hobbes,
1946). This phenomenon is closely related to the core of the concept of synergy, that
Maslow adopted from Ruth Benedict. A synergic society is one in which the individual
interest is aligned with the interest of society (Maslow, 1973, p. 210). Maslow argues
that one can “set up social institutions which will encourage individuals to be synergic
with each other,” instead of in conflict (Maslow, 1973, p. 221). If such institutions also
apply to those in power, good institutions might lead to the alignment of individual
and social interests even without the rule of one. See Maslow, Honigmann, and Mead
(1970) for more on Benedict’s ideas about synergy.
I argue that I have presented the beginnings of a Hobbesian argument in favor of
democracy. Martel (2007) has subverted Hobbes into democracy by examining
Hobbes’s use of rhetoric. My Hobbesian democracy is not the result of quests for the
hidden and “true” meaning of Hobbes, as it follows simply from a slight reworking of
the structure of Hobbes’s original views on human psychology. In Straussian terms,
Martel seeks the esoteric meaning of Hobbes, while here I take Hobbes at his word,
so to speak, and consider his exoteric text (Strauss, 1952).
When discussing liberty, Hobbes clearly states that men should have as much of
it as possible, provided it is compatible with peace; safety is not simply survival,
Hobbes says, “but also other contentments of life, which every man by lawful
industry, without danger, or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himself”
(Hobbes, 1946, p. 219). As shown, this is compatible with Maslow’s ideas about
politics. We have shown that some freedom may in fact be a prerequisite for peace,
so Hobbes would presumably not argue against this either, should we assume the kind
of human nature we have arrived at after comparing Hobbes and Maslow.
Conclusion
This examination of Maslow’s and Hobbes’s conceptions of human nature and
motivation has revealed both similarities and some key differences. First, it is
worthwhile to point out that human nature for Hobbes, as for Maslow, is not evil; the
extent to which conflict is natural can be debated. This may seem absurd to anyone
superficially familiar with Hobbes, but Hobbes attributes reason to men, and his laws
of nature are laws of reason and peace. These laws are what lead us to the common-
wealth and the state of peace. It seems farfetched to portray men pursuing the reason
they are naturally endowed with as unnatural. This leads us to a view of the state of
nature as a hypothetical way station on the path to society.
Second, I have shown how a seemingly slight revision of Hobbes’s human nature,
with the introduction of Maslow’s hierarchy of the human needs, could have major
effects on Hobbes’s political recommendations. If men “forget” that safety is every-
thing when they feel safe, and become rebellious or hard to rule as a result, Hobbes
would have to propose a state that satisfies even safe people. A state that does not
consider the higher needs of individuals will not sufficiently preserve the internal
























































































































A modern Hobbesian theory might have to include more political freedom, in the
form of some kind of democratic institutions, and a generous enough provision of both
liberty and welfare for the subjects. While Hobbes was concerned with not providing
too much liberty, with a threat to peace as a result, we have now introduced a double
balancing act, since we posit that too little liberty will also challenge the peace. A
Hobbesian liberalism with a more solid psychological foundation, in particular re-
garding the possibilities of democracy and the value of sociability, is of great
importance in a time when both liberalism and democracy face great challenges. I
have proposed a Hobbesian theory that favors liberal democracy because it is most
conducive to peace. Such a theory is realist in the acknowledgment of the potential for
conflict and the primacy of the need to avoid this. However, it departs from Hobbes’s
original theory in that liberty is not just something we might enjoy if there is anything
left when order is provided; it introduces liberty as one of the requirements for
securing such order.
Finally, I return to an important point from the introduction. As I have shown in
this article, people can be dominated by the needs they experience, and we should not
assume that Hobbes and Maslow themselves were immune to this phenomenon. I do
not want to give the impression that I am psycho-analyzing Hobbes, but there are
some obvious interpretations following from the theory here developed that are too
important to pass up on. The way Maslow describes the person dominated by security
needs can hardly be denied to be a close to perfect fit for the Hobbes that writes
Leviathan. The fact that Hobbes lived in an age of great conflict and threats to the state
and to general livelihood behooves us to bear in mind that Hobbes’s complete theory
could be colored by a predominance of security needs. Maslow mainly refers to
physical needs in the closing quote, but if the same holds true for safety needs, we may
have found a very interesting way to reconceptualize Hobbes’s political philosophy.
Following the same line of reasoning, it is possible that many modern champions of
liberty and individuality are dominated by higher needs, and that they forget, or are
unaware of, the importance of the more basic needs—the needs that are not often
frustrated in today’s society. Maslow’s focus on the highest needs may partly be the
product of his self-admittedly sheltered life, and the zeitgeist of his own time. Either
form of domination may distort the formation of a political theory.
Anyone who attempts to turn an emergency scenario into a typical one and who tries to
measure all of humanity’s goals and desires by behavior during extreme physiological
depravation is certainly blind to many things. (Maslow, 1987, p. 59)
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